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HAS THE ERIE DOCTRINE BEEN REPEALED BY CONGRESS?
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) I is
a congressional pronouncement implying that the Erie Doctrine is se-
riously erroneous. In broad terms, CAFA allows class actions that have
been filed in state courts and that are based on state substantive law to
be removed to federal court if they involve out-of-state defendants and
2
more than five million dollars in claimed damages. The legislation is
very complex and in many respects ambiguous.
The Act, however, can be interpreted as the most recent legislative
affirmation that federal procedure is appropriate for the enforcement
of state law rights. This affirmation should be taken seriously by the
judiciary, even if legislators are regarded as relatively untutored in the
interaction of federal and state law. Put in positive terms, CAFA as-
serts that, in certain types of cases, the judicious administration of
state law is better entrusted to federal courts.
This statement contradicts two pronouncements, themselves con-
flicting, by the Supreme Court concerning the relationship between
state substantive law and federal procedure. On the one hand, the
Court famously said in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York that a federal court,
in adjudicating state law, is "only another court of the State."3 On the
other hand, the Court notably held in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc. that "[t]he federal system is an independent system
for administering justice."4  More recently, in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. the Court quoted from Guaranty and Byrd,5 while ac-
knowledging that dealing with both is a "challenging endeavor."
6
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of Cali-
fornia, and Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 CAFA § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (Supp. V 2005).
3 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
4 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
5 518 U.S. 415, 427-28, 431-32 (1996).
6 Id. at 427.
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Rather than the Erie Doctrine, perhaps a better formulation of the
relationship between state and federal law would be something like
this: State law is the substantive basis of the American legal system,
displaced only selectively by federal substantive law. The federal court
system, however, provides the premier American model of the judici-
ary and, as such, is called upon to administer its form of justice in le-
gal disputes. This jurisdiction extends to any subject matter within the
power of Congress to regulate and that Congress determines, under
the Constitution, to require such attention.
7
The distinctive character of federal justice begins, first and fore-
most, with the provision in Article III that federal judges hold office
"during good behavior."8  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
study of the impeachment proceeding against Justice Chase, "good
behavior" translates into life tenure.9 That proceeding, shortly after
adoption of the constitutional regime, established that only very bad
behavior-serious criminality, probably-can result in a federal
judge's dismissal from office. 10
The federal courts are also seen as distinct since the subordinate
rules of federal procedure seem to be generally less vulnerable to in-
terest group pressures." There is a case for the proposition that all
rules of federal procedure, specifically those such as the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and others promulgated through the federal rule-
7 Cf Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 858, 872-82 (1995) (explaining the Erie tension in the context of mass
tort reform).
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREWJOHNSON 114 (1992) (hailing Justice
Chase's acquittal as an important victory forjudicial independence).
10 See generally id. at 114-34 (discussing the importance of Justice Chase's acquittal
and concluding that it "has come to stand for the proposition that impeachment is not
a proper weapon for Congress... to employ in these confrontations"). This strong
tenure provision has become of additional significance now that state court judicial
offices, under Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), are subject to
constitutionally protected politicization. See, e.g., AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, DEVELOP-
MENTS FOLLOWING REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), at 1
(2008), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/DevelopmentsAfterWhite.pdf (noting that the
Supreme Court's decision in White held that a provision preventing judicial candidates
from expressing political views was unconstitutional).
But cf John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53, 60-63 (Adrian A.S. Zuck-
erman ed., 1999) (arguing that lawyers' self-interest may have helped in the adoption
of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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making process, should be given effect in deference to congressional
policy. The following analysis may be a step in that direction.
I. ERiE DECISION AND ERiE DOCTRINE
A. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
Erie's 2 actual holding is limited and perhaps too easily forgotten.
Addressing the rule in Swi,13 the Erie Court pivotally states: "Swift v.
Tyson introduced grave discrimination by... [making] rights... vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court .... Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal pro-
tection of the law."1
4
The key terms are "rights" and "impossible." In Erie, Justice
Brandeis had prefaced this proposition by referring to Black & White
Taxicab,15 which clearly involved a question of "rights."'16 Prior to the
Black & White Taxicab litigation, one of the parties strategically created
federal diversity jurisdiction by incorporating out of state.' 7 That was
followed by the initiation of litigation in federal court, which fulfilled
the anticipated result of applying a federal decisional rule concerning
contract validity. Under this federal rule, exclusive-dealing contracts
were valid, though they would not have been under the applicable
state law. 18
Thus, by example as well as statement of the rule, the Erie decision
addressed a problem of "rights," which in context translates into sub-
stantive law. Importantly, there was nothing in the decision concern-
ing procedure or quasiprocedural rules such as statutes of limitation.
Furthermore, the improper effect that Justice Brandeis identified
was that different versions of "rights" would "render[] impossible
equal protection of the law.""' That effect is virtually axiomatic: if
substantive legal rules that are significantly different are applied in
two otherwise identical cases, and the cases proceed to the merits, it
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14 304 U.S. at 74-75.
15 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
16 Erie, at 73-74.
17 276 U.S. at 523-24.
18 Id. at 530-31.
19 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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would be solely coincidental if equal protection of the law were af-
forded.
There has been illuminating argument that even the concept of
"rights" as used in Erie was overbroad. Professor (nowJudge) Fletcher
has explained that there was a cogent concept of "general law" under
Swift v. Tyson, even if the federal courts thereafter erroneously inflated
the concept.2° There has also been criticism ofJustice Brandeis's sug-
gestion that Congress could not enact law on the subjects involved in
the Erie case, or for that matter those implicated by Black & White
Taxicab.21 Under now-established concepts of federal authority, Con-
gress could, of course, enact law on those subjects. Indeed, it could
enact substantive law on at least most of the subjects involved in the
litigation addressed by CAFA.
However, there seems little ground for dissent from the following
propositions: first, that the decision in Erie involved a rule that was
unequivocally substantive in the substance/procedure dichotomy; and
second, that a broad panoply of distinctive substantive rules of "fed-
eral common law" in diversity litigation would "render[] impossible22
equal protection" in those cases. But this second proposition does
not entail the further proposition that federal courts were required to
forego other rules, concerning something less than "substance," which
could result in different outcomes in cases tried in a federal court and
state court. Outcomes in litigation depend on many factors apart
from the rules of substantive law that are applied, and perhaps are af-
fected most particularly by rules governing the composition and pro-
cedure of the forum.
B. Erie Doctrine
Erie v. Tompkins is one thing; the Erie Doctrine is something else.
It was in decisions subsequent to Erie that the Erie Doctrine emerged.
The basic sequence is familiar, with Klaxon applying the Erie Doctrine
20 William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the ]udiciary Act of
1789: TheExample of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517-27 (1984).
21 Justice Brandeis said that "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law," Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, which is perhaps true in the strictest sense of "com-
mon law." But surely Congress now has, and I would think then had, the power to
regulate the railroad-transportation relationships involved.
2 Id. at 74-75.
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to choice of law rules, while Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap and Palmer
v. Hoffman applied it, respectively, to issues of burden of proof 24 and
the allocation of the burden of pleading contributory negligence be-
tween the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's answer. The now or-
thodox formulation of Erie Doctrine came from the decision in Guar-
anty, which pronounced the "outcome" test: "[T]he intent of [Erie v.
Tompkins] was to insure that.., the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules de-
termine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court."'2 6
The Erie Doctrine was the basis of subsequent refusals in diversity
cases to apply federal law or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27
But then came Byrd.2 s That case presented the issue of whether the
Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial applied to an issue in a diver-
sity case where that issue would be tried by a state court without a
jury.29 It seems clear that the issue was properly classified as one of
"fact" under established Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, and
hence was jury triable under federal law. It also seems clear that, un-
der the state's jurisprudence, the issue was one whose allocation to the
court rather than jury was a matter of constitutional stature.30 By the
23 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) ("[T]he
proper function of the.., federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it
ought to be").
24 Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1939).
25 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).
26 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
27 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-05 (1956) (re-
quiring that state law determine the enforceability of an arbitration clause); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (finding that Federal Rule
23 does not provide the exclusive form of control over class suits, but rather controls
only the procedural aspects, leaving states free to impose additional substantive re-
quirements); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-33
(1949) (enforcing a state rule that filing or service of summons constituted com-
mencement of the suit under the statute of limitations, rather than the Federal Rules'
definition of the commencement of the suit).
28 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
29 Id. at 537-39.
As so often is done in such cases, the Court disparaged the significance of the
matter to the law of the state, in this instance South Carolina:
The conclusion is inescapable that the [South Carolina rule] is grounded in
the practical consideration that... the courts [of the state] had become ac-
customed to deciding the factual issue ... without the aid of juries.... Thus
the requirement appears to be merely a form and mode of enforcing the
[state's rule involving the factual issue].
2008] 1633
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time Byrd arrived before the Court, the Erie Doctrine had become so-
lidified to the point of nearly constitutional status: "It expressed a pol-
icy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power be-
tween State and federal courts., 31  Hence, Byrd can be described as
presenting the issue of whether it is a violation of the constitutional
"distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts" to
apply in federal court a rule of procedure set forth in the Constitu-
tion.
It would be absurd to say that applying a constitutional rule is un-
constitutional, but that was the implication of the Erie Doctrine as it
would apply in Byrd. The Court in Byrd properly held that a constitu-
tional rule of procedure-the Seventh Amendment-could be ap-
plied, 3 but it equivocated, obviously in deference to the Erie Doctrine.
Having cited Erie, Justice Brennan said, "[a]n essential characteristic
of [the federal] system is the manner in which ... it distributes trial
functions between judge andjury... under the influence-if not the
command-of the Seventh Amendment.,
33
Surely the Seventh Amendment is a "command," not merely an
influence. However, so strong has been the pull of the Erie Doctrine
that not only has it produced such waffling as in Byrd, but it has also
induced the further conclusions that (1) the text of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 3, in application to the relationship between filing the
complaint and tolling a statute of limitations, has differential force in
34diversity and federal-claim cases, and (2) although a state rule gov-
erning service of process in relation to a statute of limitations pre-
empts Rule 3 because it is "part and parcel" of the statute of limita-
tions in one state law structure (that of Oklahoma and Kansas), it does
35not preempt Rule 4 in another state's construction (Massachusetts) ,
even though the provisions regarding service of process in the latter
36
instance were in the very same statutory section.
Id. at 536. To the contrary, the evolution of the South Carolina rule indicates that it
reflected that State's concept of the separation of powers.
31 Guaranty, 326 U.S. at 109.
32 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-39.
33 Id. at 537 (footnote omitted).
Compare Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980) (holding that
Rule 3 is not operative in diversity cases), with West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 38-39
(1987) (finding that Rule 3 controls in federal claim cases).
35 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
36 The Massachusetts statute said, in one sentence, "an executor.., shall not be
held to answer.., unless ... the writ... has been served by delivery in hand." Id. at
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The Erie Doctrine, moreover, is a key premise from which the bi-
zarre result was reached in Ferens v. John Deere Co.17 There, a claim for
personal injury occurring entirely in Pennsylvania was held to be val-
idly maintained in the federal court in Pennsylvania, even though the
same claim could not have been brought in Pennsylvania state court
because it was barred by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations.38 The
claim in Ferens was originally filed in federal court in Mississippi,
which, under the Erie Doctrine as applied in Klaxon, looked to Missis-
sippi law to determine that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations was
not applicable, and then transferred the case through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to Pennsylvania, where, so the Supreme Court decided, the
law of the transferor court (Mississippi) had to be applied under Van
Dusen v. Barrack.5
The result in Ferens has the same surreal quality as that in Black
& White Taxicab, and the same characterization could be made of the
application of the Erie Doctrine in Ferens as Justice Brandeis made of
Swift v. Tyson in Erie: "The injustice and confusion incident to the
doctrine ... have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or
limiting [its predicate]. 4 °
C. Gasperini: Confusion Compounded
A more recent, yet equally pitiful, attempt to apply the Erie doc-
trine was made in Gasperini.41 That case centered around an attempt
to accommodate the Seventh Amendment's provisions on jury trials
with a New York mechanism for controlling excessive verdicts in jury
trials.42  Indeed, Gasperini involved not one but two constitutional
rules of the Seventh Amendment.
At issue in Gasperini was whether and how the Seventh Amend-
ment should be followed, first, regarding trial court review of whether
a jury verdict was excessive, and second, regarding the Court of Ap-
462 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958)). In Walker, however,
the Oklahoma provisions were in separate statutory sections. 446 U.S. at 742-43.
37 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
13 Id. at 531-33.
39 Id. at 518-21. In Van Dusen, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964), the Court stated that a
party should not be permitted "to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court
which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was filed."
The term "result" is of course from the Erie Doctrine rather than the Erie decision.
40 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
41 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
42 Id. at 418.
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peals' review of the trial judge's analysis of the verdict.43 The diversity
case was tried in the Southern District of New York. New York legis-
lation had provisions that empowered New York state court trial
judges to set aside jury verdicts in specified situations, and allowed the
state's Appellate Division to exercise a measure of special authority in
reviewing such decisions by trial judges.4" The plaintiff in Gasperini
received a verdict that the Circuit Court thought was unjustifiably
high. 6 The problem, then, was whether and how the judges should
handle a verdict they considered to be excessive.
The Seventh Amendment, speaking to the subject of judicial re-
view of jury verdicts, provides, "no fact tried by a jury shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.' '47 There are many difficult technical
and historical problems in applying this provision to jury verdicts in
contemporary trials in federal court. For one thing, with due apology
to Justice Scalia who holds otherwise, 41 I believe that a proper histori-
cal analysis would conclude that, assuming English practice is what was
meant by the "rules of the common law," this was not fully settled in
1792 at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment. 49 That
question was fully considered by the Supreme Court in Galloway v.
United States, in which the Court suggested that the right to ajury trial
was in fact quite limited.'0 The opinions in that case can perhaps be
regarded as dicta, although they certainly were carefully considered
dicta. However, if Galloway is taken as a precedent and if precedent is
to be honored, that decision could resolve the question.
Furthermore, I believe it is reasonably arguable that the term
"rules of common law" in the Seventh Amendment refers to state
practice instead of, or in addition to, English practice. I recognize
43 Id. at 434-36, 438-39.
44 Id. at 419.
45 Id. at 420.
46 Id.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
48 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 451-58 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (using a review of English
common law to find a Seventh Amendment bar to appellate review of jury determina-
tions).
49 See the extensive discussion in Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499
(H.L.), which is quoted in the dissent of Justice Hughes in Slocum v. New York Life In-
surance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 409-415 (1913) (HughesJ., dissenting).
W 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943).
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that Justice Story said otherwise in United States v. Wonson,5 but that
was well after the adoption of the Seventh Amendment and much
constitutional and political turmoil had occurred in between. In any
event, it is common ground that state practice concerning jury ver-
dicts in 1792 was various and in some cases indeterminable 2
It is also common ground that the right to ajury trial is essentially
to be preserved under the Seventh Amendment. The essence of the
jury-trial right is that injury-tried cases, judges decide issues of law, ju-
ries decide issues of "fact," and judges decide which normative issues
arising from essentially undisputed evidence are to be considered is-
sues of "fact." The procedural apparatus to implement this principle
has varied over time in the federal courts, and, under comparable
state constitutional guarantees, from state to state.
I believe, more specifically, that it is reasonably arguable that the
term "rules of the common law," as used in the Seventh Amendment,
should be interpreted to refer to the practice prescribed for the fed-
eral district courts as they are at any historic point in time, so long as
the substance of the jury trial is preserved. The substance can be pre-
served with different mechanisms, so long as they differentiate be-
tween "law" (for the court) and "fact" (for the jury). Further, the
mechanisms can be prescribed by statute or rule; since Congress is au-
thorized to make provisions in this regard under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 3 it may delegate that authority to the Supreme Court
or a Rules Committee.
Within that framework, the Court in Gasperini could have straight-
forwardly applied the Seventh Amendment procedures with certain
modernizations authorized by Congress. Accordingly, I think Justice
Scalia in dissent was quite right in saying, the "Court commits the clas-
sic Erie mistake of regarding whatever changes the outcome as sub-
stantive.,5 4 He states further:
51 28 F. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (prefacing his determina-
tion ofjury rights on an examination of English law).
52 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 501-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (describing thejury provisions state by state before the adoption of the Con-
stitution); see also Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391-92 (noting that "[i]n 1791 this process [of
the continual evolution of jury trial rights] already had resulted in widely divergent
common-law rules on procedural matters among the states, and between them and
England").
53 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 465 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (citation omitted).
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It is simply not possible to give controlling effect both to the federal
standard and the state standard in reviewing the jury's award. That be-
ing so, the [lower] court has no choice but to apply the Federal Rule,
which is an exercise of ... Congress's power to regulate, matters...
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure."
It also seems clear, as Justice Scalia observed, that the result that
would be reached by using federal procedure in Gasperini would have
been substantially in line with the result if it had been tried in the
state court under New York procedure. 56
However, it seems to me that Justice Scalia was wrong in another
proposition he advanced, namely that the procedure required in fed-
eral court was that codified in the Seventh Amendment in 1792. In
Justice Scalia's view, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals
were confined by the "rules of the common law" as he supposed those
rules stood in 1792. 5' Justice Scalia's stark alternative may well have
driven the majority in Gasperini to rely on the Erie Doctrine to cobble
together its strange mix of federal and state law. That mix, governing
how a federal jury verdict is to be "examined" by the courts, would not
be the federal standard that a verdict may be set aside when it "shocks
the conscience" of the court, but the New York statutory standard that
the verdict "deviates materially from what would be reasonable.
'
,
58
As indicated above, there is strong reason to doubt that the Eng-
lish common law rule as of 1792 was clear and stable. Under that rule,
which had been evolving from practice as late as 1670, ajury could be
condemned if it reached an erroneous verdict,59 and in 1793 an Eng-
lish decision equivocated on the proper practice for addressing an un-
supportable verdict.6° If the lower courts in Gasperini had proceeded
as authorized by federal procedural law today, unconstrained by the
procedure of 1792, the trial court should have granted a remittitur
and the Court of Appeals acted properly in reversing the trial judge
for not having done so.
55 Id. at 468.
56 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 465-67.
57 Id. at 451-58.
58 Id. at 439-40.
59 Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1011 (C.P.) (finding that while a
jury can disagree with a judge on the proper verdict and still avoid any punishment,
this may not be true if it returns a "false verdict" in, for example, a capital case).
60 See Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (H.L.) (granting a new trial
due to jury irregularities such that the defendant, "in effect [had] not been tried").
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II. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
The conclusion that federal procedural law today should have
governed in Gasperini is based on the following propositions:
1. The Seventh Amendment does not preclude refashioning
federal procedure concerning jury verdicts, so long as the ver-
dict as to "facts" is faithfully honored when founded on legally
sufficient evidence.
2. Within the foregoing constraint and other constitutional
constraints, Congress has the authority to refashion federal
procedure.
3. Congress has, from time to time, refashioned federal pro-
cedure within that constraint, in the interest of improving fed-
eral justice. It has most recently done so in CAFA, and the
courts should proceed accordingly rather than accept Seventh
Amendment challenges to this new procedure.
A. The Appropriateness of Distinct Federal Procedures
There is a long history of interaction between state and federal
courts in which different procedures have applied and in which fed-
eral procedure has often trumped that of the state. While the Byrd
Court said, as noted above, that "[t] he federal system is an independ-
ent system for administering justice, 6' that dictum is confusing hy-
perbole. The federal court system is interdependent with state gov-
ernment and always has been. Indeed, the federal court system
presupposes the existence of the states as the primary authority in le-
62
gal regulation and policy in our diverse communities. It further pre-
supposes that there are state court systems with their own various prac-
tices and procedures. On the other hand, the system has always
reflected the recognition that state courts can be vulnerable to bias
against economic and social interests uncongenial to local senti-
ment.63 From the beginning of the constitutional regime, therefore,
federal law and practice have functioned to complement the state court
system.
61 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
62 The classic scholarly formulation of this statement is found in Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
63 Madison raised this concern at the Constitutional Convention when discussing
the proper scope for federal court jurisdiction. See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 8 (5th ed. 2003).
2008] 1639
1640 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1629
Article III of the Constitution provided for diversityjurisdiction, as
Hamilton asserted, in cases "in which the State tribunals cannot be
supposed to be impartial." 64 The importance of this concern is shown
by the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized federal court ju-
risdiction in diversity cases, but did not authorize jurisdiction in claims
65arising under federal law. The Conformity Act of 1872 and the
Process Act of 1789 conveniently provided that a federal district court
should, for cases at law, generally follow the procedure of the state in
which the court sat in these diversity cases.66 This policy allowed fed-
eraljudges and lawyers to employ locally familiar practice.
Even the emphasis on state procedure in diversity cases, however,
did not lead to complete uniformity. The Process Act was interpreted
to mean "static" conformity, only requiring federal practice to con-
form to state practice as it was at the time of the statute's enactment in
1789-1790.67 This gradually resulted in different procedure in federal
courts than in the courts of the local state, and was considered very
inconvenient. However, it should be noted that the difference in pro-
cedure resulting from "static conformity" reflected a Congressional
policy that lasted nearly a century.68
Unsurprisingly, many states modified their procedures over the
course of time, particularly after 1848 through wide adoption of the
New York Field Code system. 69 Under "static conformity" this made
for increased technicality, esoteric procedure lore, and confusion. In
1848, for example, a federal court in New York would supposedly follow
New York common law procedure of 1789, while the state courts used
code pleading as prescribed and periodically revised by the New York
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
65 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. The present diversity juris-
diction grant is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. V 2005).
6 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197; Process Act of 1789, ch. 21,
§ 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93. However, Congress prescribed a separate and procedurally uniform
system for federal equityjurisdiction. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
67 See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 125 n.25 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that the
Process Acts of 1792, 1793, and 1828 all required static conformity to state law in cases
at law).
CI See id. ("In the Conformity Act of 1872, Congress amended the Process Acts by
providing for dynamic conformity to the state law of remedies on the law side.").
61, Cf Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special
Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REv. 971, 1001-02 (2005) (noting the impact of the
Field Code in moving from "common law" to "code pleading," especially over the
merger into a single form of action with simplified pleading).
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legislature. This problem was solved when Congress enacted the Con-
formity Act of 1872 to provide for "dynamic" conformity; under that
policy, the federal courts on the "law side" would use the procedure
prescribed by current state law, not as it existed in 1789 . 70 This change
allowed federal courts from then on to use the current state procedure
on the "law side," but the federal courts continued to have separate and
nationally uniform federal procedure for actions in equity.71
State procedural law, however, still continued to differ thereafter
from one state to another. The differences were a salient considera-
tion in Congress's decision to provide for uniform federal civil proce-
dure in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.72 This Act surely expresses a
congressional policy that the federal courts should have their own
procedure. That procedure would necessarily be distinctive and
would necessarily require "refashioning," given the established varia-
tions in state procedural law.
B. The Seventh Amendment and the Refashioning of Federal Procedure
Not the least of the state procedural changes were provisions gov-
erning jury decision making. These included the motion for new trial
of broadened scope, the motion for nonsuit having the effect of a de-
cision (not merely opportunity for the plaintiff to try again), the di-
rected verdict, and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict-all of which "examined" facts tried by a jury. For example, in
the 1930s, the California Code of Civil Procedure had the following
provision that was substantially equal to what was originally adopted in
that state's Code of Civil Procedure of 1872: "An action may be dis-
missed, or a judgment of nonsuit entered... by the court, upon motion
of the defendant, when upon the trial the plaintiff fails to prove a suffi-
cient case for the jury."
73
By 1930, the California Code of Civil Procedure also had the fol-
lowing provision:
When a motion for a directed verdict, which should have been granted,
has been denied and a verdict rendered against the moving party, the
70 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
71 See Gagliardi, 564 F.2d at 125 n.25 (emphasizing the distinction between law and
equity procedure).
72 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982) (discussing the antecedent considerations leading to the passage of
the Act).
73 CAL. CV. PROC. CODE § 581 (Deering 1931).
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court, at any time before the entry ofjudgment, either of its own motion
or on motion of the aggrieved party, shall render judgment in favor of
the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict. 
74
How a federal court should handle such provisions, in the era prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, presented recur-
ring issues that required accommodation of state law to the Seventh
Amendment. The history is long and sinuous and was comprehen-
sively addressed in Galloway v. United States, referred to above.75 It
perhaps will be sufficient for present purposes to reexamine two cases
that can be cited for the proposition advanced by Justice Scalia in
Gasperini: that an "original" meaning of the Seventh Amendment is
required, under which the only legitimate procedure for setting aside
a verdict is the motion for new trial and that such a motion is in the
exclusive province of the trial judge.76
The first of these cases is Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,7 7 in
which the plaintiff sued on an insurance policy. At the conclusion of
all the evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence.78 The judge denied the mo-
tion, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, and a judgment entered
accordingly. 79 The defendant pursued appellate review. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient and,
on that basis, ordered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)
for the defendant."s The plaintiff then brought the case to the Su-
preme Court, which stated, "The questions now to be considered are,
first, whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
judgment and, second .... whether it should have awarded a new trial
instead of directing a judgment for the defendant.",8' At the very out-
set of its opinion the Court said that "when, on the trial of the issues
of fact in an action at law before a Federal court and a jury, the evi-
dence.., does not constitute a sufficient basis for a verdict.., the
74 Id. § 629 (Deering 1923). The similarity between this provision and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b) is evident. These provisions allow for a renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law following ajury verdict if "the court finds that a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party
on that issue." FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (1), (b).
7. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
76 Supra notes 54-56.
77 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
78 Id. at 368.
79 Id. at 369.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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court may and should direct a verdict."82 After reviewing the evi-
dence, the Court found that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient,
and that the Circuit Court was therefore proper in reversing the trial
83court's decision .
The Supreme Court then addressed the second issue, which was
whether the court should have directed a new trial instead of granting
JNOV. It began by observing that the JNOV procedure "conform[ed]
to a statute of Pennsylvania, the State in which the [case was tried] .84
The Court quoted the statute, which was essentially the same as Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 629 quoted above. 85  The
Court, however, held that the Seventh Amendment prescribed the ex-
clusive mechanism by which a court could address a verdict, and this
was to award a new trial. 6 At the new trial, as the Court implicitly rec-
ognized, if the evidence were the same a verdict could then be di-
rected against the plaintiff.87 The Court went on to say, about award-
ing a new trial, what has often been repeated since: "l[T] his
procedure was regarded as of real value, because... it afforded an
opportunity for adducing further evidence." 8
The decision in Slocum was five to four. The dissent was by Justice
(later Chief Justice) Hughes and was concurred in by three others in-
cluding Justice Holmes. 89 In its address of the issue, the dissent is as
long and as strong in citation as the majority opinion. It contains the
following:
Can it be doubted that it would be competent for Congress... to
provide that thereupon the [trial] court should decide the question of
law and enter judgment accordingly? ... Could it not now provide, when
the testimony is recorded stenographically, that the record so made ...
should constitute the record of the evidence for the purpose of deter-
mining the question of law thus raised?90
Justice Hughes concluded by stating:
82 Id.
83 Id. at 375.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 375-76 (quoting 1905 Pa. Laws 286); see supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
88 Slocum, 228 U.S. at 399.
87 Id. at 380.
88 Id. at 380.
89 Id. at 400 (HughesJ, dissenting).
90 Id. at 418-19.
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Of course, in any case, where there are questions of fact for the jury,
the court cannot undertake to decide them unless a jury trial is waived.
But, it would seem to be an entire misapprehension to say that trial by
jury, in its constitutional aspect, requires the submission to the jury of
evidence which presents no question for their decision. 9'
It should be noted that the lower federal court's use of the state
procedure, held to be improper in Slocum, was responsive to the "de-
fault" rule prescribed in the Conformity Act: federal courts were to
use state law unless there was some specific federal rule, constitutional
or otherwise. As Justice Hughes suggests, it would be something else if
the modification of the old procedure was a more deliberate congres-
sional choice, as in the Enabling Act and now CAFA.
There had also been a major change in prevailing procedure be-
tween 1792 and the date of Slocum in 1913: the documentary context
in which a jury verdict would be examined. In 1792, the "record" on
which a writ of error would proceed was, as Justice Hughes noted, the
pleading file, augmented under some procedures by a bill of excep-
tions. In that era there was no record of the trial testimony, nor of the
oral instructions to the jury, as now is provided in stenographic tran-
scripts. With the benefit of a verbatim transcript, as Justice Hughes
suggested, a trial judge's assessment of a jury verdict can be much
more careful, and so also in subsequent appellate review is there
much better information available as to what happened in the trial
court. After that, and since 1938 under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the record can also be readily augmented by the products of
pretrial discovery-documents and depositions. These provide still
more information about the evidence presented at trial as well as what
was available for trial.
Pretrial discovery in turn has generated two important procedural
differences concerning jury trial from that in 1792 or in Slocum's time.
First, given the broad opportunity for discovery, a party suffering a di-
rected verdict would have a high hurdle to overcome to show that a
better case might be marshaled upon a new trial. 92 The inevitable re-
sponse to such a request would be "why didn't you find that out be-
fore?" Accordingly, the opportunity for a new trial in order to present
91 Id. at 427-28.
92 See FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(2) (allowing relief from final judgment in the event of
"newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been dis-
covered in time to move for a new trial").
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additional evidence now has little or no "real value," as the majority
said in Slocum.
93
Second, comprehensive pretrial discovery has enabled summary
judgment practice to be significant, indeed modal, in contemporary
federal practice. Under the federal rules, summary judgment is
granted or denied according to whether there is a "genuine issue as to
any material fact., 94 In a case that would be presented to a jury, the
term "genuine issue" means jury triable, and that in turn means that
there is competent evidence sufficient for a jury reasonably to find
against the movant.9' The summaryjudgment procedure at pretrial is,
in effect, a preview of the directed verdict procedure at trial. Its func-
tional proximity to the motion for directed verdict has indeed led one
scholar to suggest that summary judgment is unconstitutional, 96 al-
though one may suppose that no current Supreme Court Justice
would share that view.
The other case often cited for the proposition at issue in
Gasperini-that 1792 writ-of-error procedure is the only way ajury ver-
dict can be examined-is Dimick v. Schiedt. 9 7 That case, also decided
before the Federal Rules, addressed whether a trial court could grant
additur, that is, refuse to grant a new trial sought by the plaintiff if the
defendant would consent to a specified increase in the amount
awarded by the jury's verdict. The Court held that remittitur had long
been recognized-although it considered the grounds for doing so to
be historically dubious" -but it refused to countenance additur.
The Dimick decision also was five to four, with Justice Stone dis-
senting in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices
Brandeis and Cardozo. Justice Stone said,
93 Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 380 (1913).
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
95 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) (noting the
similarities between the summary judgment standard andjudgment as a matter of law's
"reasonable jury" standard, and claiming that the appropriate inquiry is on "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury"); see
also Celotex Inc. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (requiring that a party show
sufficient evidence on each element for which it will bear the burden of proof at trial
to avoid summaryjudgment under Rule 56(c)).
96 Suja A. Thomas, Wy Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutiona4 93 VA. L. REV. 139
(2007) (arguing that summary judgment infringes on the Seventh Amendment right
to a trial byjury).
97 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
98 Id. at 482-83.
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[T] he Seventh Amendment guarantees... trial of issues of fact by ajury,
but it does not prescribe any particular procedure by which these bene-
fits shall be obtained, or forbid any which does not curtail the function
of the jury to decide questions of fact .... It does not restrict the court's
control ... to the particular forms of trial practice in vogue in 1791.99
More than this, after reviewing several other federal deviations
from 1792 practice, Justice Stone observed "[i]n fact, the very practice,
so firmly imbedded in federal procedure, of making a motion for a
new trial directly to the trial judge, instead of to the court en banc, was
never adopted by the common law."'00 To this Justice Stone appended
the following footnote: "In England, before the adoption of the Sev-
enth Amendment, the motion was made not to the trial judge but to
the court sitting en banc."'O' And, more generally, Justice Stone said,
When the Constitution was adopted, the common law was something
more than a miscellaneous collection of precedents. It was a system, then
a growth of some five centuries, to guide judicial decision. One of its prin-
ciples ... was its capacity for growth and development, and its adaptability
to every new situation to which it might be needful to apply it.102
This adaptability, however, is especially relevant when Congress
has spoken on the issue, and the common law should yield to the leg-
islative policy of Congress, within constraints clearly ordained in the
Constitution. While the concept of needing sufficient evidence to
support a verdict is clearly ordained in the Seventh Amendment, the
procedure used to carry out such a review does not seem so ordained.
In light of the significant changes since these two cases and the ex-
pressed congressional policy, provisions allowing for a directed verdict
orJNOV should not be seen as exceptional, or necessarily violative of
the Seventh Amendment.
C. Appellate Review of the Trial Judge
The other issue addressed in Gasperini was whether the Court of
Appeals could properly reverse the trial judge's determination that a
new trial should be awarded if the verdict was unsupported in the evi-
dence. As to this, the majority said that the issue had not previously
been decided by the Supreme Court, although it had often been ad-
dressed in the Courts of Appeals. Writing for the Court, Justice Gins-
99 Id. at 491 (Stone,J., dissenting).
100 1d. at 491-92.
101 Id. at 492 n.2.
102 Id. at 495-96.
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burg cited Justice Potter Stewart's earlier dissenting opinion in hold-
ing that, "[w]e now approve this line of decisions."'' 0 3 Justice Scalia
liked that proposition no more than the one concerning the standard
for granting new trial. 1
04
However, in support of Justice Ginsburg on this point, the follow-
ing may be observed: First, the Courts of Appeals are a creation of
congressional policy and, as such, can be empowered and constrained
in the scope of their review more or less as Congress might determine.
Congress has acquiesced in the exercise of the appellate authority in-
volved in Gasperini, for whatever that is worth. Second, the federal
courts never adopted an exact replica of the 1792 English common
law procedure. That procedure, as Justice Stone noted in Dimick v.
Schiedt, required referencing the new-trial question to the corps of
judges of Common Bench en banc, not to a decision of the single
judge who presided at the trial. 10° Given the dispersal of the federal
district courts in 1792, it would have been very burdensome, if not
impossible, to faithfully follow the original English model. In any
event, the supposedly hallowed constitutional model was never prac-
ticed. By default the matter was left open for later improvisation, an
improvisation that, from the beginning, involved having the trial
judge rather than the trial bench en banc, decide the issue in the first
instance. The remaining issue was what further improvisation might
be made concerning subsequent consideration of the trial judge's rul-
ing. That is, if not referral to the trial bench en banc, what other kind
of "examination" might be consistent with the basic scheme of the
Seventh Amendment? The third observation in support of Justice
Ginsburg's position is this: subjecting the trial judge's decision con-
cerning new trial to appellate review in the Court of Appeals, as the
Court in Gasperini held to be proper, is a substantial approximation of
the en banc consideration under the writ-of-error practice in the Eng-
lish model. She was, therefore, on solid ground in her assertion that
it was consistent with the Seventh Amendment to allow appellate re-
view of rulings on motions for a new trial.
103 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996) (citing Grunen-
thai v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 164 (1968) (StewartJ., dissenting)).
104 See id. at 460-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing strenuously that such a practice
constitutes a reexamination of facts found by a jury in violation of the Seventh
Amendment).
105 293 U.S. 474, 492 n.2 (1935).
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CONCLUSION
CAFA can be understood as one more of a long series of congres-
sional enactments that provide federal civil justice to various catego-
ries of litigants. Sometimes federal civil justice is provided in conjunc-
tion with federally created substantive rights and rights of private
action, such as in the Civil Rights Acts or the rights under the securi-
ties laws. The federally created rights in many of these statutes are
skeletal and require amplification by the courts or reference to state
law for basic concepts. Federal justice in such cases is partly substan-
tive but also partly "protective."' °6 However, under the federal claim
jurisdictional statute, 107 federal litigants are afforded the procedural
justice of the federal courts.
At other times, federal civil justice has been provided to litigants
that Congress has regarded as being deserving of, and as sufficiently
protected by, the quality ofjustice afforded in the federal courts, but
without creation of federal substantive rights. These categories in-
clude: (1) citizens of different states;1°8 (2) aliens in some circum-
stances;1°9 (3) a foreign state in some circumstances;" ° (4) corpora-
tions in diversity jurisdiction;." (5) corporations incorporated under
federal law; 112 (6) stakeholders needing interstate service of process
for interpleader;" 3 and (7) those in the midst of bankruptcy proceed-
ings.11 4 In this light CAFA is hardly revolutionary, and its enactment
might invite reconsideration of various applications of the Erie Doc-
trine in light of congressional policy.
106 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 139 (5th ed. 2001) (describing the process of "'protective jurisdiction,'
whereby the federal courts would protect the parties from supposed unfairness or in-
competence at the hands of state courts").
107 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
108 Id. § 1332(a)(1).
109 Id. § 1332(a) (2).
110 Id. § 1332(a) (4).
III d. § 1332(c).
112 Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 248 (1992).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000).
114 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion).
